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LESSONS LEARNED FROM UNSUCCESSFUL INTERNATIONALIZATION 
ATTEMPTS: EXAMPLE OF MULTINATIONAL RETAILERS IN CHILE 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Many retailers are expanding to foreign markets, but not all internationalization attempts 
are successful. This study utilizes an institutional perspective to examine unsuccessful 
internationalization efforts. According to this approach, retailers are more likely to 
succeed when they adapt their retail formats to the norms of the local market and achieve 
legitimacy from the relevant social actors. Four cases of unsuccessful retail 
internationalization to the Chilean market by Home Depot, Royal Ahold, Carrefour, and 
J.C. Penney, were examined. Based on expert and consumer interviews, findings show 
that these retail firms defied local institutional pressures from consumers, suppliers, 
competitors, retail executives, and the business community. Management executives of 
these firms did not embed themselves in the broader social network. It was also apparent 
the competition had anticipated and responded to their sources of competitive advantage. 
Finally, their scale was not big enough to command any advantages in the supply chain 
network.  
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LESSONS LEARNED FROM UNSUCCESSFUL INTERNATIONALIZATION 
ATTEMPTS: EXAMPLE OF MULTINATIONAL RETAILERS IN CHILE 
 
Introduction 
Companies from all sectors seem to be engaging in internationalization as an 
opportunity to achieve further growth. Major U.S. and European retail firms such as Wal-
Mart, Carrefour, and Royal Ahold are internationalizing intensively due to high levels of 
local competition and saturated markets (Incandela et. al., 1999). Furthermore, since the 
mid 1990s, a growing number of international retailers have shifted their attention to 
developing economies (e.g., Barth et. al., 1996). These companies are driven by 
opportunities in these countries, like high growth rates, growing middle class, and 
weakness of local retailers.   
While internationalization can be a source of profitability for retail firms, it can 
also generate huge losses and frustrated outcomes since one of the most difficult 
experiences for a retail firm is the international expansion. Empirical evidence shows that 
success in the home countries does not guarantee success internationally. Several 
examples of failed retail internationalization attempts are found in the literature. For 
example, Marks & Spencer (U.K.) withdrew from the Canadian and U.S. market after 
several years of meager performance (Burt et. al., 2002).  
Another example of unsuccessful internationalization attempt is Home Depot’s 
recent withdrawal from Chile. The inauguration of their first store in 1998 in Santiago, 
was attended by the President of Chile and his wife. Many consumers visited this store 
during the first months. Since Home Depot had been successful in the internationalization 
process to Canada, the owners were convinced that the source of competitive advantage 
that had led the company to become so successful in the U.S. could do the same in Chile 
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(Marcus & Blank, 1999, p.201). However, after three years of operating in Chile, the 
results were not quite what they expected. Home Depot’s operation in Chile resulted in 
enormous losses which led the company to exit the country at the end of  2001.  
Why do successful retailers fail in specific markets? Research on international 
retailing only point towards the importance of considering differences in the host 
environment and adapting accordingly (e.g., O’Grady & Lane, 1997). However, there is 
still little understanding of international mistakes that lead to unsuccessful outcomes.  
We apply an institutional approach as a theoretical base to explore the main 
mistakes of internationalizing retail firms. This theoretical perspective recognizes 
variation in the institutional environments across different countries that can affect 
legitimacy and survival of organizations (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). Specifically in a retailing context, it suggests that every country has a set of 
relevant institutional norms that retailers must conform to in order to be perceived as 
legitimate by relevant social actors (Bianchi & Arnold, 2004).  
The data obtained in this study are based on four case studies of large and 
successful international retailers; Carrefour, Home Depot, Royal Ahold and J.C. Penney, 
that failed in their internationalization attempts to operate in Chile. Findings show that 
these companies lacked legitimacy and support from the relevant local social actors due 
to several mistakes related to internal and external elements of their transfer strategy. 
Literature Review 
The internationalization process has been assessed by theoretical and empirical 
research within the fields of international business (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), marketing 
(Cavusgil, 1980), and retailing (Alexander & Myers, 2000). The internationalization 
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process includes several different aspects that are worthy of investigation, such as 
motivation to internationalize, choice of markets, and mode of entry strategy (Anderson 
& Gatignon, 1986; Sternquist, 1997). Theoretical frameworks for understanding retail 
internationalization processes are also mentioned in the literature (Vida & Fairhurst, 
1998; Alexander & Myers, 2000).  
Although the contribution of these frameworks is notable, most of this work 
addresses pre-internationalization aspects of this process, while issues of divestment and 
failure, are still under researched. The scant but insightful research on divestment and 
market exit is recent  and based on case studies (Alexander & Quinn, 2002; Burt. et. al., 
2002; Wrigley & Currah, 2003). For example, Wrigley & Currah (2003) examine the 
case of Royal Ahold’s problems in Latin America, and conclude that a main challenge for 
Ahold was to operate in Latin American markets, with weak institutionalized business 
environments, and economic crisis. Similarly, Burt et. al. (2002) analyzed M&S in 
Canada, and concluded that fundamental differences between the Canadian and the UK 
market were never addressed. The main mistake was that M&S tried to replicate its 
format in a different competitive environment, which led to a lack of differentiation.  
The conclusions of these studies suggest that internationalizing firms encounter 
barriers and differences when expanding abroad which can diminish the effective transfer 
of the competitive advantage to foreign markets (O’Grady & Lane, 1997; Samiee, 1995; 
Dupuis & Prime, 1996). Overall, there is a recognized need for international companies 
to align their products and services to the host market because of environmental 
differences. Therefore retailers cannot expand to other countries without adaptation of 
their retail practices to fit the needs of culturally distinct consumers.  
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Institutional Framework 
Retail firms are embedded in a general environment comprising several social 
actors that guide and shape the strategy, practices, and formats of retail firms. When 
retailers internationalize they have to operate in a new institutional environment, which 
differs from the home institutional environment. Drawing from an institutional approach 
to retail internationalization (Bianchi & Arnold, 2004), successful international retailers 
need to achieve legitimacy and support from the relevant social actors of the new local 
market, and therefore are subject to a new set of retail norms.  
Retail norms refer to expectations of behavior and appropriate practices for retail 
firms. For instance, governments support retailers that comply to host laws and 
regulations. Suppliers support retailers that comply with relational exchanges. Employees 
support retailers that adhere to human resource practices, and consumers support retailers 
that comply with low prices, assortment, service quality and convenience.  
Furthermore, international retailers need to develop a  strategy to transfer their 
source of competitive advantage to new markets, which should consider not only external 
elements of the firm (retail practices such as assortment, shopping-environment, service, 
location, and price), but also the internal elements of the firm (management systems, 
expertise in logistics, supplier negotiations, financial management, and strategic 
direction) (Goldman, 2001) Both elements are of critical significance to gain a strong 
competitive position in a host country. Thus, we state the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Retailers in foreign markets need to adhere to local retail norms in 
order to achieve legitimacy and support from relevant social actors. 
 
Hypothesis 2: External and Internal elements of the international retailer affect the 
necessary legitimacy and support from relevant social actors. 
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Research Methodology 
Case study research was used to explore the previous research hypotheses. This 
methodology allows obtaining rich insights of processes (Yin, 1994). Four cases of 
unsuccessful retail internationalization attempts in the Chilean market were studied: (1) 
the operation of Home Depot in Chile, during 1998-2001, and (2) the operation of Ahold 
in Chile during 1997 - 2003, (3) the operation of Carrefour in Chile during 1997-2003, 
and (4) the operation of J.C. Penney in Chile during 1995-2000. These are the only 
international retailers that attempted to operate in Chile during the 1990’s.   
Following the recommendations of Yin (1994), Eisenhardt (1989), and Stake 
(2000), data for this investigation was collected from a variety of sources, including 
secondary sources (e.g., company documents and press articles), and interviews. 
Company documents of the retail industry in Chile, corporate annual reports, and press 
articles related to the retailing industry of the past 10 years (Mercurio, Estrategia, Capital, 
and Que Pasa) were recollected during the period of study to support the findings.  
Twenty semi-structured, face-to-face in-depth interviews were held with 
executives that had worked for the firms under study, along with experts of the industry 
of retailing in Chile. Interviews were held during December of 2003, and had a duration 
average of 65 minutes. Informants were recruited by the main researcher as a 
convenience sample based on their representativeness and closeness to the cases assessed. 
Real names were changed for purposes of confidentiality. In addition, ten in depth 
interviews were undertaken with end consumers regarding their perceptions of the four 
retailers mentioned in the case studies. All interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. 
Inferences resulted from analysis and interpretation (Spiggle, 1994).   
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Local Industry Analysis 
The retailing situation in Chile differs from other South American countries in 
that Chilean retailers have consistently and fiercely defended their local market from 
foreign competitors. The largest companies of grocery retailing, department stores, and 
home improvement, are all Chilean family businesses, that compete strongly in this small 
market (see Appendix 1).  
The supermarket industry in Chile is the most relevant within the retail industry. 
The largest grocery retailers in Chile are D&S and Cencosud,  concentrating 50% of the 
grocery retail market in 2003. The three largest department stores have 40% of market 
share. Falabella is the largest department store retailer in Chile, owned by the Solari 
family and also operates in Peru and Argentina. Ripley is the second largest department 
store retailer in Chile, owned by the Calderon family, and also operates in Peru. 
Almacenes Paris operates only in Chile and belongs to the Galmez family. Large home 
improvement retailers are also family businesses. Sodimac belongs to del Rio family, and 
is the largest firm of home improvement in Latin America, with 47 stores in Chile and 5 
in Colombia. Easy belongs to Cencosud and has 27 stores in Chile and Argentina.  
During the last decade, the Chilean retailing industry has shown an increased level 
of consolidation and concentration due to competitive pressures. Threats from foreign 
retailers have led these firms to invest in technology, logistics, and training, in order to 
defend their competitive position successfully.   
Foreign Retailers  
 Home Depot is the largest home improvement retailer in the world. By the end of 
2003, the firm operated more than 1,500 stores throughout the United States, Canada, and 
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Mexico, with net sales of US$58.2 billions during the fiscal year 2002 
(www.homedepot.com). Home Depot started its internationalization process in 1994 with 
Canada, followed by Chile in 1998, Argentina, 1999, and Mexico in 2001. Home Depot 
entered the Chilean market through a partnership with Falabella. After three years of 
continuous losses, its operations in Chile were sold to Falabella.  
Carrefour is the largest grocery retailer in Europe and operates more than 9.000 
stores in 30 countries, with net sales of US$64.7 billion during the fiscal year 2002 
(www.carrefour.com). Carrefour is the second largest retailer in Latin America after Wal-
Mart, and has operations in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Colombia. Carrefour 
inaugurated its first hypermarket in Chile in 1998, however it remained a small player for 
six years. By the end of 2003, sold its seven hypermarket stores to D&S.   
The Dutch retailer Royal Ahold operates more than 4.000grocery stores in 27 
countries, with net sales of US$ 59.3 billions, in 2002 (M&M Retail Planet). Ahold’s 
entry strategy in Latin America relied strongly on partnerships. To enter Chile, Ahold 
partnered with Velox Retail Holding, owner of the Argentinean retail chain Disco, and of 
the Chilean supermarket chain Santa Isabel. During 2003, Ahold disclosed accounting 
irregularities of $900 million, and withdrew from Latin America.  
J. C. Penney Corporation, Inc. is one of America’s largest department store, with 
net sales of US$32.3 billion in 2002 (M&M Retail Planet). By the end of  2003, J. C. 
Penney operated more than 1.000 department stores throughout the United States and 
Brazil. J.C. Penney opened one store in Santiago in 1995, however after five years of 
losses, J.C. Penney closed its operation in Chile and sold to Almacenes Paris, all of its 
assets and equipment.   
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Interviews 
Five main themes emerge from the interview data as important and common 
mistakes made by all four retail firms studied.  
1.- Retail Practices and Formats    
All four international retailers standardized several elements of the retail format, 
such as product assortment, layout and decoration of stores. For example, J.C. Penney 
never took adequate consideration of the differences between Chile and the U.S., and its 
product offering was not totally suitable to the tastes and preferences of the Chilean 
consumers. Their massive purchasing systems, their way of exhibiting the products and 
their product assortment was replicated from the North American model. 
“Chilean consumers were used to shopping for electronic products in department 
stores, but J.C. Penney didn’t sell them. I guess we have different shopping habits 
than in the U.S.” (Francisco, ex- retail employee of J.C. Penney).  
 
“Chile has a different culture than the U.S., and J.C. Penney didn’t consider this 
difference in culture. They know much about logistics and how this business 
works, but they didn’t consider our market. They didn’t put the customer in first 
place. They said this is what we have, take it or leave it. And the customer left it” 
(Ricardo, ex- J.C. Penney executive).  
  
Home Depot had the same problem as J.C. Penney. Home Depot was perceived as 
less attractive stores for women and family shopping. Respondents mentioned that Home 
Depot’s store atmosphere and lay out of the store wasn’t attractive for women consumers, 
who were relevant decision makers. The data show that most women consumers 
preferred to shop at Home Depot’s main competitor Sodimac, because of their  attractive 
stores, merchandise assortment, and the importance given to family shopping.  
Furthermore, some of the male informants mentioned that although they enjoyed 
shopping at Home Depot, their wives didn’t like the store and preferred to shop at 
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competitors such as Sodimac or Easy, although they were perceived as being more 
expensive than Home Depot. For example, Marcelo admitted that he had received a good  
service from sales clerks in Home Depot, but he shopped at Sodimac or other stores 
because of family pressures.  
“The Home Depot that I visited was untidy. It was a huge shack where there were 
lots of construction materials. I never returned to the store again. A huge place 
that I didn’t like at all”(Javiera, consumer). 
 
Carrefour also lacked enough support from consumers to make the stores 
profitable. Local competitors such as LIDER that belong to D&S, were better at 
satisfying the Chilean consumers. Carrefour did not add value or differentiate from 
LIDER hypermarkets in the eyes of the consumers. 
“LIDER was more familiar to me. Perhaps LIDER and Carrefour have the same 
products, but I just don’t like the Carrefour stores. LIDER satisfies totally my 
needs” (Magdalena, consumer).   
 
“ I can go to LIDER and spend hours, and I usually go for a few things and finish 
with a full cart. It is fun to shop there. You just can’t leave without buying things. 
Even the parking is comfortable and bright. Not like Carrefour, rough, hidden, 
difficult to access. I don’t want to go to Carrefour” (Juan, consumer). 
 
Respondents thought that these companies didn’t consider if their model of 
retailing was exportable and if it needed adjustment to Chile or Latin America. Home 
Depot, Carrefour, and J.C. Penney  tried to implement a retail format in Chile without 
any modification.  Experts thought that the rigidity of the North American retail models 
in Chile were related to the failure that retail firms had encountered. 
2.- Mode of Entry 
J.C. Penny and Carrefour entered the foreign market through a Greenfield 
strategy, with out the advise of a local partner. Their entry mode strategy was a mistake. 
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They should have engaged in a partnership with a local firm that already knew the 
marketplace and consumer preferences.    
On the other hand, Home Depot engaged in a joint venture with a local retail firm 
Falabella, and Ahold entered the Chilean market through a partnership with an 
Argentinean retailer. Home Depot didn’t listen to Falabella, which was a well respected 
firm in the Chilean market. Falabella was very unhappy with Home Depot’s performance 
and attempted several times to participate in their decision-making, but without any 
result. Home Depot constantly reminded their partner that they were the best home 
improvement retailer in the world, and that management decisions should be taken by 
them. Home Depot’s managers held their own board meetings without allowing their 
partner to interfere. Falabella could have been a good partner because of its experience in 
the Chilean market, but Home Depot didn’t consider their opinion for strategic decisions. 
Ahold partnered with Velox, a financial company, and owner of Disco, one of the 
largest food retail chain in Argentina. In entering this partnership, Ahold became 
accountable for Velox’s debts to banks, and was also affected by the Argentinean crisis. 
Additionally, when Ahold bought Santa Isabel, it realized that they had to invest a great 
deal of money to continue operations. They had to improve their formats, change 
inadequate locations, refurnish some stores, train their employees, and add services. 
“Although Santa Isabel had been growing very fast, and opening stores every 
year, its financial base was not solid. The retail chain had several operational 
problems such as lack of strategic vision for the future, format problems, location 
problems, and cost structure problems since it leased properties without 
considering proper negotiations” (Enrique: ex-executive of Santa Isabel). 
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3.- Operating Costs and Logistics 
Home Depot was perceived as having arrived in Chile and behaving in a very 
arrogant way when dealing with suppliers. Home Depot was never able to sell large 
volumes in Chile and obtain the best purchasing conditions. Home improvement 
suppliers believed that Home Depot’s attitude towards local suppliers had resulted in a 
stronger relationship between suppliers and Home Depot’s competitors. 
“Executives at Home Depot were arrogant with Chilean suppliers. Home Depot 
wanted to have the best purchasing condition of the whole market because of their 
expected large volumes. But they never had big enough volumes so they never 
were able to obtain the best conditions” (Pedro, supplier).  
 
Suppliers of home improvement merchandise realized that Home Depot was not 
the large player predicted, and admitted that they had consistently offered higher prices 
and unfavorable conditions to Home Depot compared to Sodimac due to the lower level 
of purchasing volume. Furthermore, although Home Depot paid suppliers on time, Home 
Depot was never able to sell large enough volumes to obtain better purchasing conditions. 
“Home Depot only had five stores, but Sodimac that has over 50 stores and larger 
volumes, so Home Depot did not have access to large discounts. The conditions 
obtained by Sodimac were usually 2, 3 or 4% lower than Home Depot, because 
Sodimac knew how to negotiate in Chile” (Claudio, supplier).  
 
J.C. Penney executives recognized that operational and logistic costs of operating 
only one store were very high, and didn’t compensate the investment in Chile. Although 
the initial idea was to open at least five stores in Chile, which would provide better 
results, executives mentioned that they couldn’t find the right opportunities to expand in 
the local market. Additionally, J.C. Penney confronted several problems such as 
limitations of space and localization. Most of the malls owned the main competitors of 
J.C. Penney. Also, the merchandise was inadequate, with a high logistic costs due to the 
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different seasons.  When J.C. Penney arrived, all the good locations were taken, and 
could only open a store in Alto Las Condes, which belongs to Cencosud. For J.C. Penney 
it was impossible to find a new location, and remained only with one store. This inhibited 
large purchase volumes in order to absorb overhead and have competitive prices.  A 
similar situation was encountered by Carrefour:  
 “J.C. Penney had a problem with their purchases because they were all done in 
Dallas. They didn’t have local suppliers. They didn’t buy anything in Chile. They 
had a centralized system, very sophisticated, but with an American taste, thinking 
for example, ah, Chileans are Latinos, they like shirts with flowers” (Cristian, ex-
retail manager of J.C. Penney).  
 
 “The problem with Carrefour was that they didn’t have a strategic plan for 
growth. Because they came too late, prices of good locations were expensive. 
They had to invest lots of money in growth in order to cover the country with 
stores and become a relevant actor. Volume is very relevant in this industry in 
order to obtain lower prices, and relationships with suppliers” (Ramon, expert). 
 
4.- Retail Executives 
Home Depot executives were not well accepted by suppliers, competitors, other 
retail executives, and the general business community in Chile because of their low 
educational and social background.   
“Although Carrefour was a very international firm, they make the mistake of 
choosing a French person as a manager for Chile. This man was ready to retire 
and although he had much experience, with many years in the company, it didn’t 
work in Chile. He was not able to connect with the market, or read the important 
variables that affect this business in order to make it profitable. They didn’t get 
the right information from the marketplace. He didn’t understand the Chilean 
consumers” (Tomas, ex-retail manager of Carrefour).  
 
Finally, business experts made reference to the characteristic of the management 
team of Home Depot that came from the U.S. Several respondents thought that Home 
Depot Corporation had made a big mistake with the person chosen to lead the Chilean 
operation in Chile, summed to a lack of control of his managerial actions. Most 
 15
respondents indicated that American firms usually sent unqualified managers in charge of 
Latin American and Chilean operations, and these managers were chosen only based on 
the fact that they spoke Spanish, but not based on the manager’s capabilities. Americans 
tended to see all Latin Americans in the same way, and this was considered a mistake. 
“Home Depot hired a man who would spend lots of money. The same thing 
happened with all of the ‘warriors’, which were a group of division managers that 
came from the U.S. These guys would just drink all the time, and there was a total 
lack of control from the home office. This guy fired the original manager of 
Home Depot, because [he] would complain about his excessive spending and 
dishonest habits” (Gustavo, retail manager of Falabella). 
 
“The top executive in Chile for JC Penny was a very sharp American woman. She 
copied strongly the American model of JC Penny. This woman only spoke 
English which was also a disadvantage. You can’t communicate with your 
customer and in this business you have to talk and understand your customer. If 
you only speak English it is difficult” (Pedro, supplier). 
 
Ahold delegated to Velox group the management of Santa Isabel. Velox had been 
successful in operating Disco in Argentina, but Chile was a different market. When they 
took control of Santa Isabel, instead of looking for a experienced manager, they chose a 
general manager that didn’t come from the retail industry, but instead from the beer 
industry. This company needed a strategic focus to grow in Chile, along with a radical 
turn around. Two general managers didn’t work, so they finally put an Argentinean 
manager which didn’t know the Chilean marketplace. Santa Isabel had permanent losses 
until the firm was sold to a local competitor, Cencosud, during 2003.   
5.- Local Competitors 
In all four cases analyzed, the local competitors were prepared when the foreign 
rivals arrived. Local firms were not asleep but wide awake and ready to fight. 
Respondents mentioned that in Chile there is usually strong communication among 
competitors. Sodimac for example, was ready for Home Depot’s arrival and it had 
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developed an aggressive strategy of hiring a new CEO, training the employees, opening 
more stores, and improving logistics. Other smaller retailers had also followed Sodimac 
in this battle against Home Depot.  
“I talk very often with my competitors. There is usually much communication in 
this market among competitors. This is very Chilean, but the people at Home 
Depot weren’t allowed to do so.” (Patricio, ex-Home Depot Chilean Manager).    
 
D&S and other local retailers fought strongly against Carrefour. For instance, 
D&S had acquired strategic locations in advance which made it hard and expensive for 
Carrefour to find good locations. Additionally, D&S learned much from Carrefour, since 
the firm hired an ex manager of Carrefour from Spain, and studied its operation in 
Argentina for a few years. In these circumstances, Carrefour’s decision to go for organic 
growth rather than to proceed through acquisitions proved a costly mistake. After five 
years of continued losses Carrefour was in fifth position in the market, having secured 
only a 2.67% market share. Carrefour admitted publicly that it underestimated the 
strength of the local competition. In doing so, Carrefour effectively repeated the same 
mistakes that led Sears, J.C. Penney, Home Depot, and Ahold to fail in establishing a 
profitable presence in Chile.  
“When Carrefour decided to enter Chile in 1998, D&S, had already studied 
Carrefour for a while. They brought people from Spain that had worked in 
Carrefour and copied it. Although LIDER was not as strong as Carrefour, they 
had the first mover advantage and knew the local market” (Salvador, ex-retail 
manager of Carrefour)  
 
“Home Depot came with a mentality a little presumptuous, thinking that their 
source of competitive advantage was going to be successful, but not recognizing 
that there was also a firm, similar to Home Depot, that was working in its own 
market, with a force much more rooted in Chile, a very efficient competitor” 
(Jorge, ex-executive of Home Depot). 
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Discussions and Conclusion 
 Why did all of this internationalization activity fail? The data from interviews 
supports hypothesis 1, and suggests that retailer legitimacy, which refers to social actor’s 
approval of an international retailer operating in the host market, was not totally achieved 
in the four cases analyzed. This is because their international retail strategy didn’t 
conform to the salient norms of retailing for the relevant social actors in Chile.  
For example,  women were relevant social actors in Chile due to the importance 
of family members in Hispanic countries, and most retailers didn’t gain their patronage. 
Additionally, local suppliers were also relevant social actors for international retail firms 
that needed merchandise availability, and appropriate discounts. Local competitors 
regularly met at social or business events and shared information and maintained a good 
relationship among them, which was not the case of foreign retailers. Retail executives 
were expected to have high levels of education and income, and preferentially have a 
Chilean Spanish background, which was not always the case for international retailers. 
Finally, the general Chilean business community was also a relevant social actor for 
retailers. Directors of large retail companies were considered influential people in the 
Chilean society, and personal relationships among them were valued. 
The data from the interviews also supports hypothesis 2, and shows that the 
international retailers made a number of mistakes related to the internal and external 
elements of the strategy of format transfer. These mistakes restrained the international 
firms to comply with the norms of retailing and achieve the necessary legitimacy from 
relevant social actors in Chile. In all cases studied, there was a lack of clear directions for 
operating in a new market. This is a management failure, and an internal element of the 
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transfer strategy. There were global ambitions for the firm, but no real commitment in 
converting these ambitions into something more concrete. Despite the size, sales, and 
experience in international activities of all of these companies, there was no clear 
understanding of the management, and systems needed to develop the business.  
Second, many of the retail practices that were successful in the U.S. or other Latin 
American markets did not apply to Chile. The data illustrate the view that although 
companies may be successful in their home markets, they must consider differences and 
barriers in the new environment when transferring their retail practices and formats. This 
is related to the external elements of the transfer strategy. Third, all international retail 
firms were not able to achieve large volumes in Chile because they didn’t’ have a clear 
expansion plan in order to grow fast and obtain good discounts from suppliers. 
By belonging to a different country or not allowing the Chilean partner to 
participate in strategic decisions, the executives failed in perceiving Chilean salient 
norms. The cases studied of Home Depot, J.C. Penney, Carrefour, and Ahold suggests 
that international executives and the top management team at headquarters must be alert 
and committed. A final and most important mistake was the little importance given to the 
strategies and actions of  local competitors, and the lack of preparation for confronting 
these firms, that already were settled and successful in the Chilean market.   
The main issue for international retail managers is that they must adapt their retail 
practices and formats to the expectations of host actors to gain legitimacy. However, 
adapting retail practices such as assortment, prices, layout and service is not enough. 
External elements such as managerial know-how, technology, logistics, and human 
resource practices are also relevant and need to be considered.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 1 – Retailing Industry in Chile 2003* 
 
Chain  Market 
Share 
Sales 2003 
MMUS$ 
N° Stores Ownership 
Grocery Retailing     
D&S 32,92 1.958,6 68 Ibañez Family 
Cencosud 21,4 1.551,5 97 Paulmann Family 
     
Department Store 
Retailing 
    
Falabella 40 1.790,3 28 Solari Family 
Ripley 17 751,4 24 Calderón Family 
Almacenes París 15 656,3 20 Gálmez Family 
     
Pharmaceutical Retailing     
FASA 33 360,3 226 Codner Family 
Salcobrand 32 349,4 230 NA 
Cruz Verde 30.3 330,8 308 Harding Family 
     
Home Improvement 
Retailing 
    
Sodimac 21.1 806,6 54 Del Río- Solari Family 
Easy 4.8 183,5 16 Paulmann Family 
 
* Source: Company Annual Reports, 2003; AC Nielsen Report 2003. 
 
